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REVIEWS 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani­
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama­
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any m.ember who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights," 
Environmental Ethics, Vol. 4, No.1, Spring, 1982, pp. 17-36. 
Norton wants to show that envi ron­ th is view, actions a re good if they 
mentalists "lack a coherent theoretical maximize the happiness of the totality 
rationale around which to rally." As of humans, ignoring nonhuman indi­
evidence of this alleged lack, Norton viduals. According to Norton, this 
cites two cases in which environmen­ view is unsatisfactory as a rationale 
talists failed to achieve thei r goal: for preserving the environment 
the Tellico dam project on the Ten­ . because if human preferences are 
nessee River, and the Dickey-Lincoln modified in the appropriate way, then 
hydroelectric project on the St. John any given natu ral object or species 
River in Maine. But why did enVi­ could be destroyed. For example, if 
ronmentalists fai I to stop these pro­ no human had any interest in saving 
jects? From Norton's own account, it the North American timber wolf 
looks like one reason was that they because, say, these wolves do not 
could not agree on what sort of ethi­ make good pets, then there would be 
cal appeal to make, and not that they nothing wrong with allowing this 
lacked a coherent eth ical theory. species to become extinct. 
They couldn't decide whether to make 
a utilitarian appeal or to defend the No doubt this sort of utilitarianism 
rights of endangered species. is unacceptable; but why not expand 
Besides, they could have had a cohe­ utilitarianism to include nonhuman ani­
rent theoretical rationale and still mals? Following Bentham (and 
failed to stop the projects in question Singer), we can say that any creature 
because they were up against big capable of suffering should be 
business and greed for profit. included in our utilitarian calculation. 
This sort of "sentient utilitarianism" 
. Why aren't standard ethical theo­ could be used to argue against 
ries such as utilitarianism and rights destroying the natural habitat of non-
theory a coherent basis for environ­ . human animals, since this would cause 
mental ethics? Norton argues that them to suffer. In any event, it is 
these two approaches are inadequate, hasty to conclude that utilitarianism 
at least as a basis for envi ronmental cannot provide an adequate environ­
eth ics. The fi rst view he discusses is mental ethic just because one version, 
utilitarianism, or more specifically "anthropocentric utilitarianism," which 
"anthropocentric utilitarianism." On is not even the most plausible 
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version, cannot do the job. 
Most of Norton's article is con­
cerned with a second approach to 
envi ronmental ethics, namely the 
appeal to the rights of nonhumans. 
Unlike some authors, he does not 
challenge the attribution of rights to 
nonhumans. This is because, he 
accepts (with a couple of additions) 
Feinberg's account of rights. On this 
account, if X is an individual who can 
have an interest, then X can have a 
right. Not all interests imply rights, 
but some do; in particular the interest 
in not suffering implies a right not to 
suffer. Rights can be overriden by 
other goods and obligations. But all 
individuals who are capable of suffer­
ing to a comparable degree must be 
considered equally, and this means 
that some nonhumans who have an 
interest in not suffering have a right 
to not suffer. 
Norton says that his account gives 
only the "minimal conditions" for hav­
ing a right. He does not attempt to 
say defi nitely wh ich interests are s uf­
ficient for having a right (although he 
is willing to grant that the interest in 
not suffering implies a right not to 
suffer), nor does he say what goods 
or obligations cou Id override rights. 
This leaves several important ques­
tions unanswered, for example, does 
the human interest in consuming ani­
mal flesh override the right of animals 
not to suffer? 
Anyway, assuming that nonhuman 
animals do have rights, including the 
right not to suffer, why doesn't this 
imply that we have corresponding 
duties to them such as the important 
environmental duty to preserve their 
natural habitat? This is the main 
issue, and Norton devotes several 
pages to attacking the claim that non­
human rights imply envi ronmental 
duties. Let us confine our attention 
to four of Norton's arguments. 
First, no matter where one draws 
the line as to what has interests (and 
corresponding rights), there will 
always be some area of earth or sea 
which is not the habitat for any 
rights-holding individual, and which 
does not have to be preserved to pre­
vent the violation or rights. 
One difficulty for this argument, 
and indeed for Norton's whole article, 
is that he ignores the possibility that 
future individuals have rights. He 
accepts. Feinberg's account of rights, 
but he ignores Feinberg's contention 
that futu re generations can have 
rights. .But if we assume that there 
will be rights-holding individuals in 
the future, as Feinberg does, and 
that they will need places to live, 
including presently unoccupied places, 
then it seems that we have a duty to 
preserve these places for future indi­
viduals. Fu rthermore, even if we 
confine our moral consideration to 
those presently living, we would still 
have a duty to preserve uninhabited 
areas as possible habitats for those 
living in too-crowded areas or those 
who need to roam. The North Ameri­
can timber wolf, for example, requires 
as much as ten square miles of wil­
derness in order to survive. So we 
ought to preserve large areas of basi­
cally uninhabited land for them, 
assuming that we grant that they have 
a right to su rvive. 
Second, Norton argues that if the 
class of rights holders is restricted to 
primates, the resulting environmental 
ethic will not protect areas which 
affect no primates. But why should 
we restrict rights to primates? Aren't 
there creatu res capable of suffering 
who are not primates? Moreover, 
even restricting our concern just to 
primates, it is hard to see what areaS 
of land or sea we can safely destroy 
or pollute without affecting any pri­
mates; presumably human primates will 
be affected no matter what area of 
land or sea is polluted. After all, 
8 
destroying or polluting one area of 
land or sea affects other areas - an 
H-bomb exploded in some remote place 
still produces wide-spread radioactiv­-
ity. 
Now suppose we adopt Singer's 
view that sentience is where we draw 
the line between those we morally 
consider and those we don't. Then 
we should preserve the environment to 
prevent the suffering of sentient cre­-
atures.Norton replies, third, that it 
is always possible for humans to pre­-
vent the suffering of sentient crea­-
tures while at the same time destroy­-
ing their natural habitat. The animals 
whose natu ral habitat has been 
destroyed could be "moved to zoos or 
other preserves, protected from pred­-
ators, given food and shelter." 
Perhaps relocation of animals would 
reduce thei r sufferi ng when thei r 
habitat has been destroyed, but it 
would not eliminate this suffering. 
The animals would suffer less if their 
natural habitat was not destroyed in 
the first place. Besides, what about 
future generations of animals? 
Wouldn't they suffer from the loss of 
thei r natu ral habitat? 
Fourth, Norton mentions a serious 
practical difficulty: Should we concern 
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ourselves with individuals or with 
whole species? The animal liberation­-
ist tends to be concerned with indi­-
vidual animals, but the environmental­-
ist is worried about preserving whole 
species, and is not so concerned 
about the fate of individual animals. 
Thus environmentalists advocate the 
culling of deer and buffalo herds in 
the absence of natu ral predators. 
Leopold, for instance, recommends 
hunting as an ideal form of human 
recreation in the same book in which 
he introduces his famous land ethic. 
But vegetarians and antivivisectionists 
will object that culling deer by hunt­-
ing or just random slaughter causes 
needless suffering for the animals. 
Surely this is not an insurmounta­-
ble problem. There must be a better 
way to control the population of ani­-
mals than hunting and random killing; 
nobody seriously advocates this as a 
way of limiting the human population, 
so why should we do this to animals? 
An alternative would be sterilization. 
Environmentalists 
agree, at least in 
ought not to cause 
fering to sentient 
they can do this 
can and should 
principle, that we 
unnecessary suf­-
individuals, and 
without giving up 
their goal of preserving the natural 
envi ronment and nonhuman species. 
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